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Abstract 
 
In this paper I present relativism (as found in John MacFarlane's work) using 2-dimensional propositional matrices and other 
tools from philosophical semantics. I also identify some of the key features of relativism and closely related theories, 
distinguishing relativism from contextualism and nonindexical contextualism (moderate relativism). Next, I discuss the 
problem of disagreement, and the problem facing the relativist who tries to capture genuine disagreement. Finally, I gesture 
at my preferred view, that the sentences under consideration are ‘assessment indexical’, and provide an insight into its 
possible mechanics. 
 
 
Recently, relativism about truth has come into vogue in the philosophy of language. In particular, 
authors like John MacFarlane have elaborated on traditional relativist themes to solve problems in 
subjectivist semantics. In what follows I will present MacFarlane’s relativist semantics and examine the 
common intuition that relativism can’t account for genuine disagreement. In closing, I will mention 
another possible position that is often ignored in the literature. 
 
Contemporary relativists attempt to accommodate a particular intuition that I will call ‘Variance’: 
 
Variance: The same sentence may have different truth-values in different contexts.  
 
Mundane examples of Variance are sentences like ‘I am hungry’ or ‘It is raining here,’ which may vary 
in truth-value depending on who or what place is being talked about. Sentences that change in truth-
value are called context sensitive. Context sensitive sentences may be used in different contexts to 
express different propositions (more generally, different semantic contents). These mundane examples 
are uncontroversial since it is clear that words like ‘I’ or ‘here’ vary in their reference.  
 
Subjective matters also seem to lend to context sensitivity. If I find the Mona Lisa beautiful, it seems 
that I may truly utter ‘the Mona Lisa is beautiful’ and my Philistine friend may also truly utter ‘the 
Mona Lisa is not beautiful.’ Contextualism, a contemporary approach to more controversial cases of 
Variance, explains the shifting truth-value of these sentences by positing changes in content between 
the assertions. On one possible contextualist view, my utterance expressed the proposition that I find 
the Mona Lisa beautiful, while my Philistine friend’s utterance expressed the proposition that he does 
not find the Mona Lisa beautiful. But if this is so, then he and I were wrong to think we disagreed, since 
I speak only of my own taste and he of his; it does not seem that the truth of my utterance implies the 
falsity of his, a basic (if inadequate) test for disagreement.  
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Relativism addresses this problem of lost disagreement by varying truth-value without varying the 
proposition expressed. Instead of comparing a proposition to a world to determine a truth-value, the 
relativist compares the proposition to a world plus another parameter, for instance a standard of taste. A 
relativist like MacFarlane might argue that my Philistine friend denied exactly what I said about the 
Mona Lisa, and that my assertion is only accurate relative to me — in other words, my friend and I may 
both be right, at least from a “higher,” metasemantic, perspective (since from my perspective, my friend 
is wrong).  
  
It is not initially clear that relativism can make sense of disagreement. In its simple form, which defines 
nonindexical contextualism (moderate relativism) it clearly cannot:  
 
NI: Proposition p is true as used at context of utterance c(u) iff p is true at {W[c(u)], 
S[c(u)]}, where W[c(u)] is the world of c(u) and S[c(u)] is the speaker's relevant 
standard in c(u).  
 
NI defines nonindexical contextualism, the view that the truth of a proposition concerning a subjective 
matter varies with the taste of the asserter of the proposition. Nonindexical contextualism differs from 
other contextualist views, like the one mentioned above, because the proposition expressed by each 
assertion remains constant, only the relevant circumstance of evaluation changes. Recanati (2008) 
defends this view under the title ‘moderate relativism’; however, as MacFarlane notes, there is no more 
disagreement on this account than there is between assertions of ‘It is raining’ across times or worlds. 
So, MacFarlane includes another index: 
 
R: Proposition p is true as used at context of utterance c(u) and assessed from context of 
assessment c(a) iff p is true at {W[c(u)], S[c(a)]}, where W[c(u)] is the world of c(u) and 
S[c(a)] is the assessor's relevant standard in c(a). 
 
MacFarlane claims that R defines ‘assessment sensitivity,’ the view that the truth-value of certain 
propositions (and the accuracy of assertions) can change with the assessor (I’ll assume for this paper 
that an assertion is accurate only if it expresses a true proposition).  
 
But what is a context of utterance, or a context of assessment, and how do they come apart? In order to 
unpack the definitions above, I need to present some of the tools of philosophical semantics, mostly 
following Kaplan (1989). These tools prove useful in distinguishing relativism, contextualism, and 
nonindexical contextualism in ways previously unappreciated. It will be seen that contextualism and 
relativism are intimately related, to the extent that every contextualist reading may be transformed into 
a relativist reading.1 
 
Broadly speaking, languages are made up of meaningful expressions, some of which are sentences and 
noun or verb phrases. Expressions are evaluated with respect to circumstances of evaluation, which for 
most purposes are a world or an ordered pair of a world and a time, though they may be more finely 
individuated. To evaluate an expression is to assign it an extension. Predicates have a set as their 
extension, the set of all things that satisfy the predicate. Sentences have truth-values as their extension.2 
The inclusion of circumstances of evaluation is insufficient to do semantics because sentences may 
express different propositions in different contexts, as noted above. Kaplan's example draws this out: ‘I 
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am here now’ will be true as uttered by anyone in any context, and so seems to be necessarily true. But 
it is not necessarily true that I am here now, since I might have been somewhere else. I will follow 
Kaplan in calling terms like ‘I’ and ‘here’ 
index, a context of utterance.  
 
For our purposes, a context of utterance is a situation combined with a designated n
purposes of semantics) filled with whatever roles are demanded by the expression in question. For 
instance, ‘I am here now’ requires a 3
requires an agent or an agent and time, if you like (I won’t address time here). The context of utterance 
plays a distinct role, but may double as the circumstance
know if an assertion was accurate where and when it was made. 
 
Using this 2-dimensional system of contexts and circumstances we can construct the following example 
of a propositional matrix for the indexical se
below demonstrates the process of fixing the referent of ‘I’ with respect to a context, and then assigning 
a truth-value corresponding to whether or not the referent of ‘I’ is the president in the ci
evaluation (here the column labels indicate worlds in which different men won). The first row is 
labeled ‘Obama Speaks’ and so indicates a context in which Obama utters ‘I am 
States.’ What he said in his utterance is t
Notice that the reference of the definite description ‘President of the United States’ 
circumstance, since the context of utterance is only used to fix the referent of indexical
  
 
We are now in a position to define a relativist view as one that implies column variation in these 
matrices when world and time are held fixed. There are a couple steps to make this precise. First, we 
choose a set of possible worlds across which t
condition met when the assessors have the same standards in each possible world and the qualities of 
the relevant object or event remain constant. Then we choose a subset that contains worlds in w
each of the assessors in turn utters the sentence under consideration.
contextualist reading of the sentence uttered will yield necessarily equivalent columns but possibly 
varied rows, since the content of the sentence will va
 
Take the following example: Together at a meal, Alice and Joan find dinner delicious but Susan does 
not. Let the row labels of the following matrix indicate each speaking the
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indexical. To account for these terms we need a second 
-tuple of agent, place, and time. ‘I am the queen of France’ 
 when appropriate, for example if we wish to 
 
ntence ‘I am president of the United States.’
President of the United 
rue in the first world, but false in the second two worlds. 
he assessors of a subjective matter have constant tastes, a 
3
 Within this subset, the 
ry with the speaker but the facts do not. 
 sentence ‘Dinner is 
Faller | 44 
 
-tuple (for the 
 The matrix 
rcumstance of 
does vary with the 
s.  
 
hich 
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delicious,’ and the column labels indicate each assessing the assertion that dinner is delicious. Then we 
can draw the following matrix representin
  
 
Rows vary as the speaker changes, since on the contextualist reading the sentence ‘Dinner is
expresses a different proposition for each speaker, something lik
even though in the third column Susan is assessing the assertion, Alice is the speaker, and (on the 
contextualist reading), what Alice said 
by NI above, defines the same matrix as the contextualist, because the speaker determines the truth
value of the proposition expressed. This highlights the chief reason I do not consider noni
contextualism to be a relativist theory of truth: all assertions will be absolutely correct or incorrect, 
regardless of who assesses them, once it is determined who made the assertion. 
 
Interestingly, we can recover the relativist reading of ‘Din
matrix. First, we introduce the †-operator, or dagger operator.
diagonal of a propositional matrix and projects it onto the horizontal, which will transpose the 
Contextualist matrix. If we apply the †
matrix: 
  
 
The matching rows represent the relativist thesis that the same proposition is expressed regardless of 
speaker, and varied rows the thesis that the assess
as the constraints on the worlds selected mentioned above are respected, one will always be able to 
recover the Relativist matrix from the Contextualist matrix by applying the dagger operator. 
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g the contextualist reading: 
e ‘I think dinner is delicious.’
is true for Susan. Note that nonindexical contextualism, defined 
 
ner is delicious’ from the contextualist 
4
 The †-operator takes the left
-operator to the Contextualist matrix we recover the Relativist 
or of the assertion determines the truth
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 delicious’ 
 Thus, 
-
ndexical 
-to-right 
 
-value. As long 
 
Res Cogitans (2012) 3:1                                                                                                                                                Faller | 46 
 
 
2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
  
From these considerations we arrive at the necessary and sufficient condition for a theory to qualify as 
relativist mentioned above: Keeping in mind the constraints on the set of worlds under consideration, if 
a theory determines any column variance then it qualifies as relativist. Equivalently, a relativist theory 
implies that some propositions become sensitive (i.e. vary in truth value) if circumstances are more 
finely grained than mere worlds at times. MacFarlane includes the standards of the relevant assessor in 
the circumstance of evaluation, a move to assessment sensitivity. Assessment sensitivity is 
demonstrated in the relativist matrix above. Given an understanding of how these matrices are used, 
this condition serves as a functional definition of relativism. Note, however, that this definition does not 
deem nonindexical contextualism relativist, a result I embrace but I am sure some would not.  
 
This formulation of relativism is also useful because it highlights the new proposition that the relativist 
introduces to the contextualist, the proposition that is represented by the truth-values along the 
diagonal. To be a relativist one does not need to deny that sometimes contextualism is correct. It is 
sufficient to claim that there is also a further proposition, represented by the truth-values along the 
diagonal, that is true for the assessors of a certain relevant standard and false for those that hold the 
opposite standard across all possible worlds where the assessment is possible. The contextualist is 
committed to denying that any proposition with that set of truth-values exists. 
 
Now, with some understanding of the relativist approach, we can move on to the prime motivation for 
relativism: relativism's ability to preserve genuine disagreement.5 I will call the intuition that parties 
can genuinely disagree about subjective matters. 
 
Disagreement: 
Disagreement: When a speaker makes an assertion concerning a subjective matter, and the audience 
denies the assertion, the speaker and audience genuinely disagree.  
  
It is important that the disagreement discussed here is not mistaken for the act of disagreeing, which 
can occur whether or not two parties assert incompatible assertions. Instead, genuine disagreement 
occurs when two parties affirm incompatible propositions. For example, one may disagree with 
Creationists about the age of the earth without ever having met them. One may disagree by denying a 
proposition (“The Creationists think the earth is 5,000 years old, but it isn't”) or by affirming an 
incompatible proposition (“The earth is actually over 4.5 billion years old”).  
  
The following case is illustrative the type of examples called upon by the relativist who appeals to 
Disagreement (this one is of epistemic modals). Susan and her classmate Harry are studying in the 
basement of the library, when Susan whispers to Harry, “It's so cold today it might be snowing.” Ben 
overhears, but from his angle he can see that it is not snowing and he thinks, “Susan is wrong, it is not 
snowing.” The puzzle is this: from Susan's perspective (let’s say that she saw on the weather report that 
it was likely to snow, and her weatherman is really good) it seems perfectly true that it might be 
snowing. However, from Ben's perspective it seems false that it might be snowing, since he can see that 
it isn't actually snowing.  
  
A contextualist may accommodate this instance of Variance by making ‘It might be snowing’ context 
sensitive. On this reading, Susan's comment to Harry means something like ‘For all I know, it is 
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snowing’. If this is what Susan's comment meant, then Ben does not really disagree with Susan, since 
his belief only concerns the weather, not Susan's justification. This explains how Susan can correctly 
believe that it might be snowing while Ben may correctly deny that it might be snowing. But this 
approach leaves an important datum unexplained: Ben believes that Susan is mistaken, and it seems 
likely that if he were to correct her then she might retract her assertion (e.g. “I was wrong, it's not 
snowing”).   
 
Roughly, the Relativist makes the truth of ‘It might be snowing’ relative to each assessor, without 
altering the content expressed by each utterance. Susan and Ben believe contradictory propositions, but 
the truth of those propositions is relative. When Susan initially utters ‘It might be snowing,’ what she 
says is true relative to her standards. For Ben, however, the proposition expressed by Susan is false. 
The Relativist claims to preserve disagreement because from either perspective the other's belief is 
false. This has been called ‘faultless disagreement’ by MacFarlane (2007) and Kolbel (2004): 
disagreement because by either’s lights the other is mistaken, and faultless because from a 
metasemantic perspective both may be accurate in their beliefs.  
 
But why does Ben’s belief imply that Susan’s belief is false? This is a legitimate worry, since a parallel 
has been drawn in the literature between relativism, temporalism, and the treatment of assertions across 
possible worlds, 6 but in the latter cases few claim that there can be genuine disagreement. This is not to 
say that the proposition asserted and its negation are compatible, or that one can believe both 
coherently, just that two separate and seemingly contradictory assertions may be accurate. For 
MacFarlane, however, there is no sense in which two conflicting assertions on subjective matters can 
be accurate simpliciter; accuracy of assertion must also be relative to a context of assessment. But 
making assertion relative also makes disagreement relative, since the accuracy of my assertion will only 
relatively make my friend’s incompatible assertion inaccurate. MacFarlane embraces this result and 
defends this move to ‘perspectival disagreement,’ since it seems to capture the data the best of any 
theory.  
 
According to R, from one context of assessment an assertion on a subjective matter and its denial are 
inconsistent. However, MacFarlane glosses over that there can only be disagreement in the object 
language, not in the metalanguage. For instance, my Philistine friend may correctly respond to me, 
“You are wrong (object language), but your assertion is accurate as assessed from your context of 
assessment (metalanguage).” In the object language we are bound to our own context of assessment, 
but in the metalanguage we may freely ‘look from above,’ meaning the facts will be absolute. But if 
this is so, why do we think that there is disagreement, and why must we speak the object language? 
MacFarlane hasn’t answered these questions satisfactorily.  
 
The alternate view I prefer is the oft-overlooked ‘assessment indexical’ account. The rough idea is this: 
a single utterance of a sentence in a context expresses many propositions, and a different one for each 
assessor. Cappelen (2008) defends a similar view, so we may begin with his P1 and P2 that define 
Pluralist Content Relativism:  
 
P1: An utterance u of a sentence S in a context C will (literally) assert (and say and 
claim) a plurality of propositions. 
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P2: What’s said by an utterance u of S in a context of utterance C varies across contexts 
of interpretation (i.e. contexts of assessment).  
 
Cappelen calls the assessment indexical account monistic content relativism (MCR). He does not 
defend this view, but he describes MCR as follows: “On this view, there’s one proposition asserted by 
any utterance of a sentence [relative to a context of interpretation], that proposition is its semantic 
content, and that content can vary across contexts of interpretation” (271).  
 
The use of pluralistic content relativism can account for the data supposedly explained by relativism 
without resorting to the use of relative truth. But, while he explains its utility, Cappelen does little to 
explain the mechanics of his theory; he only mentions that it would piggy-back on the explanations 
found in Relativism and Contextualism. If we adopt MCR, however, a new line of explanation presents 
itself.  
 
To begin, as Lasersohn (2005) notes, what is asserted in the subjective cases mentioned above is not an 
ordinary quantified statement of the form ‘Everyone who looks at the painting will find is beautiful’ or 
even ‘Some who look at this painting will find it beautiful.’ But what Lasersohn (and others) miss is 
that we are not constrained to ordinary quantifiers, since not all quantifiers in natural language match 
those in first-order logic. This has been well noted in the past; for example, Boolos (1984) mentions 
examples like “For every A there is a B,” which cannot be expressed in first-order notation.  
 
With this in mind, I would like to present a few parallel examples that elucidate how an assessment 
indexical view might look. We begin with the assertion (a bet) ‘If the Blazers win, they’ll win big.’7 
Clearly this is not an assertion of the material conditional, since one does not win the bet if the Blazers 
lose. The best explanation is that the assertion is not completed until the Blazers win, meaning the 
assertion itself is conditional (instead of a conditional).  
 
Now take the example, ‘For each game they play, if the Blazers win, they’ll win big.’ This seems to 
iterate the conditional assertion to each game. While a single bet is made, the bet represents many 
assertions. The form of this quantifier loosely matches Boolos’s example above, since the bet applies to 
every game but does not simply quantify over them.  
 
How does this help? I would like to suggest that the content of an assertion like ‘the painting is 
beautiful’ is roughly ‘for each viewer, if they view this painting, they will find it beautiful,’ interpreted 
as a bet like the Blazers example. This explains why a single recalcitrant case does not negate the entire 
assertion and why any individual who disagrees might speak up. This move is similar to the use of 
functions to explain temporal propositions or the essential indexical as in Sider’s Four-
Dimensionalism, and also Recanati’s moderate relativism, since it may employ a two-dimensional 
framework (the difference is that Recanati thinks the neutral content can have a truth-value, while I see 
it as merely the assertion of a bet that will have many instances, some true and some false).  
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1 A similar point is made in Crispin Wright, "Relativism about Truth Itself: Haphazard Thoughts about the 
Very Idea, in Relative Truth, Oxford University Press 2008, pp. 157-186 
2
 The notion of content should not be confused with extension; it is precisely the relativist thesis that a 
single sentence can have a fixed content but varied extension. cf. MacFarlane “Nonindexical 
Contextualism,” 232. 
3
 For the moment we forget Kaplan's use of ‘context of utterance’ to refer only to possible situations in 
which an agent may utter a sentence, not actual cases of utterance. 
4
 The dagger operator was first introduced by Frank Vlach, “‘Now’ and ‘Then:’ A Formal Study in the 
Logic of Tense Anaphora,” Ph.D. diss., UCLA. 
5
 This is identified as a chief motivation by Lasersohn (2005), MacFarlane (2007), and Kolbel (2004). 
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6
 For instance in Kolbel (2004) and MacFarlane (2005). 
7 This example was suggested to me by Troy Cross, who attributed it to Keith DeRose.  
